

AZERBAIJAN'S ANTI-COLONIAL SHIFT IN FOREIGN POLICY

 **Sevda Ibrahimova***

Institute of Oriental Studies named after Academician Ziya Bunyadov, ANAS,
Baku, Azerbaijan

Abstract. The article examines the emergence and development of anti-colonial rhetoric in Azerbaijan's foreign policy and its transformation into an instrument of contemporary diplomacy. The study places this process in the context of post-Soviet state-building, the Karabakh conflict, Azerbaijan's participation in the Non-Aligned Movement and its chairmanship of the organization from 2019 to 2024. Particular attention is given to the gradual adaptation of the language of decolonization to Azerbaijan's interpretation of its territorial conflict and, following the restoration of control over Karabakh, to the extension of the anti-colonial agenda to territories beyond the South Caucasus. A central component of this diplomatic strategy has been criticism of France and its governance of overseas territories, particularly New Caledonia (Kanaky), French Polynesia, Mayotte, Guadeloupe, Martinique and French Guiana. The article analyzes the activities of the Baku Initiative Group, the International Front for Decolonization and other state-linked structures, as well as the use of international conferences and United Nations platforms to promote the decolonization agenda. It also considers Azerbaijan's South-South cooperation initiatives, including humanitarian and educational programs. The article concludes that Azerbaijan's anti-colonial turn is best understood not as a fully consistent ideological doctrine, but as a pragmatic diplomatic instrument that enables Baku to expand its influence in the Global South, strengthen its negotiating position and advance its foreign-policy interests.

Keywords: *Anti-colonialism, Baku Initiative Group, Non-Aligned Movement.*

Corresponding Author: *Sevda Ibrahimova, Institute of Oriental Studies named after Academician Ziya Bunyadov, ANAS, Baku, Azerbaijan, e-mail: sevda.saidova@gmail.com*

Received: 22 August 2026; **Accepted:** 15 September 2026; **Published:** 23 October 2026.

1. Introduction

When the Soviet Union broke apart in 1991, Azerbaijan along with other new independent states of the post-Soviet space needed to create their own institutions of governance and develop a sense of shared national identity during the same period without any historical models to follow (Koplatadze, 2025). Azerbaijan's political development took place amid severe economic crisis, including hyperinflation and a long and devastating conflict over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh that shaped the country's politics for nearly three decades (Jansezian, 2024). Throughout the 1990s, Azerbaijani leaders sought relationships with major Western oil corporations and attempted to secure Azerbaijan's admission to organizations such as the UN, while simultaneously managing a highly unstable, Russian-dominated regional security system (Ismayilov, 2015).

Eventually, this balancing act resulted in a strategic decision. Rather than choosing to be part of either NATO or the Russian-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization, Azerbaijan became one of the few former Soviet republics to join the Non-Aligned Movement on May 25, 2011, achieving full member status

(Makili-Aliyev, 2021). Azerbaijani policymakers determined that formal neutrality would give them greater flexibility than membership in a military alliance would - a determination that appeared ever more prescient as Georgia and Ukraine, each pursuing NATO membership, came under direct military confrontation with Russia (Aghayarov, 2022).

Membership in the Non-Aligned Movement also meant accepting the principles set forth by the 1955 Bandung Conference: mutual respect for sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs and peaceful coexistence. In the years immediately following its accession, Azerbaijan remained largely a quiet participant within the Movement; however, over the following decade it emerged as an active leader among members and Baku held the rotating chairmanship from 2019 to 2024 (AIR Center, 2025).

This article traces how Azerbaijan's emergence as a leader within the Movement, combined with a marked decline in relations with France after 2020, pushed Azerbaijani foreign policy toward an explicitly anti-colonial posture. It examines the institutional frameworks Baku built to carry out this policy, the conferences and campaigns those institutions have run.

2. Non-alignment as a strategic foundation

The Non-Aligned Movement has its roots in the 1955 Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung, Indonesia, where a number of post-colonial leaders - among them Jawaharlal Nehru, Gamal Abdel Nasser and Josip Broz Tito - set out an alternative to choosing sides in the Cold War (Makili-Aliyev, 2021). The movement's founding purpose was ending imperialism, colonialism and what its members called neocolonialism. For a state that had just spent seventy years inside the Soviet system, this history supplied a ready vocabulary for framing Azerbaijan's own territorial disputes (Jansezian, 2024).

Azerbaijani foreign policy through the 2000s and 2010s reflected an effort to balance several relationships at once. With Russia, Baku pursued energy cooperation and security coordination aimed at avoiding open confrontation while managing dependencies left over from the Soviet period. With the United States and Europe, Azerbaijan built hydrocarbon export routes and infrastructure projects such as the Middle Corridor, seeking international recognition and diversified trade. With the Global South, membership in the Non-Aligned Movement offered a path to building voting coalitions at the United Nations and establishing Azerbaijan as a credible middle power. These were not separate tracks pursued for their own sake - each served a single underlying objective: defending Azerbaijani sovereignty over Karabakh without provoking a confrontation Baku could not win.

That defensive posture began to change once Azerbaijan took up the Movement's chairmanship.

3. From member to movement chair

During its chairmanship years, Azerbaijan sought to revitalize several of the Non-Aligned Movement's institutional functions, which had grown fairly dormant by the late 2010s (AIR Center, 2025). Under President Ilham Aliyev, Baku ran a series of initiatives directed at concerns shared across the developing world, most visibly

through its campaign against so-called “vaccine nationalism” during the COVID-19 pandemic (Avraham, 2023). Azerbaijan proposed and helped convene a Special Session of the UN General Assembly on equitable vaccine access, an effort that generated considerable goodwill across the developing world (Avraham, 2023).

Baku also used its chairmanship to press for structural reform of the UN Security Council, arguing that its permanent membership no longer reflects current geopolitical realities and leaves African, Islamic and non-aligned states underrepresented (Avraham, 2023). This institutional advocacy ran alongside a more pointed rhetorical strategy. Azerbaijani officials began describing the conflict over Karabakh not as a localized territorial dispute but as a struggle against foreign-backed occupation, deliberately borrowing language from the decolonization movements of the 1960s (Jansezian, 2024). The approach worked: dozens of post-colonial states backed Azerbaijan's position in Non-Aligned Movement declarations that called the occupation of Azerbaijani territory illegal and barred member states from recognizing or assisting it (Jansezian, 2024).

By the time Azerbaijan recaptured Karabakh, it had already built the rhetorical and diplomatic infrastructure to defend that action internationally. What followed was a shift from a defensive use of anti-colonial language to an offensive one.

4. The rupture with France and the anti-colonial turn

Once the Karabakh conflict was settled on the battlefield, Azerbaijani foreign policy no longer needed to manage an active territorial dispute at home and planners in Baku turned toward a more assertive, outward-facing diplomatic strategy (Farhadova, 2026). The immediate trigger was a breakdown in relations with France. After the 2020 war, Paris took an openly critical line on Azerbaijan's military conduct and on what it described as rising domestic authoritarianism.

Both chambers of the French parliament went on to pass resolutions recognizing the breakaway “Republic of Artsakh”, a step even Armenia's government had avoided taking (AIR Center, 2025).

Rather than responding through the usual channels of bilateral diplomacy, Baku chose to challenge France on a different front: its remaining overseas territories. Azerbaijani officials and state-linked institutions began publicly criticizing French governance in New Caledonia (known to its indigenous population as Kanaky), French Polynesia, Mayotte and the Caribbean departments of Guadeloupe, Martinique and French Guiana (Caucasus Watch, 2025). Through conferences and relationships built with independence movements in these territories, Azerbaijan positioned itself as an advocate for decolonization in places thousands of kilometers from the Caucasus.

The strategy serves several purposes at once. It raises the domestic political cost of France's Armenia policy by drawing attention to unrest in French overseas territories (Caucasus Watch, 2025). It diverts international scrutiny away from Azerbaijan's own human rights record by directing attention toward the history of French colonial administration (Jansezian, 2024). And it has allowed Baku to build a network of supporters across the Global South - a network it can point to as evidence of its middle-power standing (Farhadova, 2026).

5. Institutional architecture

To carry out this strategy on a sustained basis, the Azerbaijani state built a set of organizations that operate with varying degrees of formal distance from the government (AIR Center, 2025) - chief among them the Baku Initiative Group, the International Decolonization Front and the Center of Analysis of International Relations. The Baku Initiative Group was formally established on July 6, 2023, during a ministerial meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement's Coordinating Bureau in Baku (Baku Initiative Group, 2023). Although it carries the formal status of an international non-governmental organization, the group is funded and strategically directed by the Azerbaijani government, functioning as Baku's main vehicle for decolonization advocacy (Caucasus Watch, 2024).

Under Executive Director Abbas Abbasov, the group built a sizable international footprint in a short time. By February 2026 it had organized more than forty conferences and events at venues including UN offices in New York, Geneva and Vienna, along with Rome, Istanbul and Baku (Turkic World, 2025). It reports having produced roughly 150 research studies, more than forty written reports, three books and a series of submissions to the UN Human Rights Committee and the UN Special Committee on Decolonization - the body known informally as the C-24 (AZERTAC, 2026a).

The International Decolonization Front emerged from the First Congress of Nationalist and Independence Movements, held in Baku on July 17 and 18, 2024 (Turkic World, 2025). The congress was co-organized by the Baku Initiative Group and the People's Union for the Liberation of Guadeloupe and brought together pro-independence parties and civil society figures from French and Dutch overseas territories. It concluded with a founding declaration establishing the Front as a standing platform for coordinating protests, advocacy campaigns and reparations claims (Abdulla, 2025).

Academic backing for the campaign comes from the Center of Analysis of International Relations, a government-funded think tank established in 2019 and known by its acronym, AIR Center (2025). The Center produces policy papers responding to French media coverage that accuses Azerbaijan of running disinformation operations in New Caledonia, presenting itself as a counterweight to what it calls the foreign policy failures of the Macron government (AIR Center, 2025).

6. The conference circuit

The practical work of this policy runs through a steady sequence of conferences, each building on the last. The first, “Towards the Total Elimination of Colonialism”, took place in Baku on the same day the Baku Initiative Group (2023) was founded and led directly to the organization's creation. On October 20, 2023, the group held a conference titled “Neocolonialism: Violation of Human Rights and Injustice”, bringing together representatives from former and current French territories (Jansezian, 2024). Two months later, on December 22, 2023, the “Decolonization Dialogues” conference - co-organized with the Parliamentary Network of the Non-Aligned Movement and its youth organization - marked the anniversary of the UN's 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Baku Initiative Group, 2023).

In 2024, the campaign moved outside Azerbaijan for the first time. The “Decolonization: Awakening of the Renaissance” conference, held in Istanbul on February 24, drew fifty delegates from thirteen countries and five international organizations, who drafted an open letter to French President Emmanuel Macron demanding an end to French administration in Corsica, Melanesia, Polynesia and the Antilles (AZERTAC, 2024). The letter also called on UNESCO and the OSCE to send fact-finding missions to investigate environmental damage and the loss of cultural heritage in these territories.

By 2025, the Baku Initiative Group had carried the same arguments directly into UN institutions. A conference at the UN office in Vienna produced a cooperation memorandum between the group and the Tavini Huiraatira party of French Polynesia (Azvision.az, 2024). On April 15, 2025, the “Decolonization: Silent Revolution” conference at UN Headquarters in New York, held as a side event of the Permanent Forum of People of African Descent, launched a petition calling for recognition of colonial oppression and reparations, citing past UN resolutions and statements by President Aliyev (OHCHR/Baku Initiative Group, 2025). A further conference in Baku in February 2026, “Neocolonialism and Global Inequality”, closed with a declaration on sovereignty over natural resources and the launch of an associated virtual museum (AZERTAC, 2026b).

7. New Caledonia and the Kanak question

New Caledonia, called Kanaky by its indigenous Kanak population, is the clearest illustration of how this strategy works in practice (Caucasus Watch, 2024). France has occupied the Pacific archipelago since 1853 and the Kanak population - now about 41 percent of residents - has long faced economic and political exclusion (IWGIA, 2026). The 1998 Nouméa Accord set out a twenty-year plan to transfer powers to local authorities and hold three referendums on independence (Veloz, 2026). The first two, in 2018 and 2020, produced narrow majorities for staying with France - 57 percent and 53 percent respectively. The third, in December 2021, was boycotted by most Kanak voters because of disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic (Winter, 2026). Despite pleas from Kanak leaders to postpone the vote, France held it anyway and the result - 96.5 percent against independence - has never been accepted by the pro-independence Socialist Kanak and National Liberation Front (IWGIA, 2026).

The dispute turned violent in May 2024, when the French National Assembly proposed expanding New Caledonia's electorate to include metropolitan settlers who had lived there for ten years - a change that would have diluted the political weight of the indigenous population (Caucasus Watch, 2024). The unrest that followed left thirteen people dead, led to nearly three thousand arrests and caused extensive economic damage. The French government declared a state of emergency, deployed counterterrorism police and deported sixty-nine Kanak activists and political prisoners to mainland France (Baku Initiative Group, 2026a).

French Minister Manuel Valls then led closed-door talks that produced the Bougival Accord on July 12, 2025, a thirteen-page agreement that would have made New Caledonia a “state” within the French Republic with a form of joint nationality, while leaving defense, finance and security under French control (Abdulla, 2025). The pro-independence movement rejected the deal and New Caledonia's territorial

Congress later voted 190 to 107 to block its constitutional enshrinement, following a motion introduced by pro-independence legislator Emmanuel Tjibaou (Winter, 2026). The agreement did not hold.

The International Decolonization Front, backed by the Baku Initiative Group, was an early and vocal critic of the accord. In a statement issued on July 29, 2025, the Front argued that the agreement's notion of “shared sovereignty” was a way of permanently tying Kanaky to France while presenting the arrangement as autonomy and called on the international community to recognize the Kanak as a sovereign people (Abdulla, 2025). That advocacy appeared to pay off the following spring: on May 7, 2026, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination issued a formal warning to France under its Early Warning and Urgent Action Procedure, stating that any political changes affecting New Caledonia required the free, prior and informed consent of the Kanak people and raising concern about the use of force during the 2024 protests (Baku Initiative Group, 2026a). The Baku Initiative Group quickly described the warning as confirmation that its advocacy strategy was working.

8. Mayotte and the Comoros

Azerbaijan's campaign has also focused on Mayotte, an island in the Indian Ocean that Baku treats as a direct parallel to its own territorial dispute with Armenia (Caucasus Watch, 2025). In a 1974 referendum, three of the four islands making up the Comoros archipelago voted for independence; Mayotte voted to remain with France. Paris then separated Mayotte from the rest of the Comoros - a decision the UN General Assembly repeatedly condemned as a violation of the Comoros' territorial integrity. A 2009 referendum made the separation permanent, turning Mayotte into France's 101st department (Caucasus Watch, 2025).

In 2024, the Baku Initiative Group organized a conference in Baku titled “Illegal French Occupation of Mayotte Island of the Union of Comoros”, bringing together pro-independence figures and Comorian diplomats (Caucasus Watch, 2025). The framing lets Baku draw an explicit comparison: Azerbaijani officials argue that France's defense of its hold on Mayotte, despite UN resolutions against it, sits awkwardly next to Paris's support for separatism in Karabakh (AIR Center, 2025).

9. French Polynesia and the Caribbean

The Baku Initiative Group serves as an international platform for pro-independence movements across French Polynesia, Guadeloupe, Martinique and French Guiana, which otherwise face administrative constraints on reaching the international community as easily (Baku Initiative Group, 2026b). On January 21, 2025, the group organized a conference on the independence of Réunion Island that examined the territory's economic dependency on France and outlined possible paths toward self-determination (OHCHR/Baku Initiative Group, 2025).

Several of these conferences have centered on environmental and public health grievances. At the Istanbul summit in 2024, Caribbean delegates described the long-term effects of chlordane - a pesticide once used widely on banana plantations - which has left more than 90 percent of adults in Guadeloupe and Martinique with measurable contamination and has been linked to some of the highest prostate cancer rates recorded anywhere (AZERTAC, 2024). During the COP29 climate conference

in Baku in late 2024, the Baku Initiative Group ran side events tying this kind of environmental damage to its broader decolonization argument, linking the political campaign to the global climate agenda (Turkic World, 2025).

10. Soft power and the Global South NGOs platform

Azerbaijan's anti-colonial campaign sits inside a larger effort to build standing relationships with civil society groups across the developing world. The Global South NGOs Platform, first proposed during COP29 in November 2024, now includes more than 650 organizations from 116 countries (Farhadova, 2026). On May 14, 2026, the platform held its first General Assembly in Baku and elected Azerbaijani researcher Fuad Karimli - who is affiliated with the state-linked Topchubashov Centre - as General-Secretary for a five-year term, a result that keeps the organization's direction firmly in Azerbaijani hands (Farhadova, 2026).

In his opening address, presidential aide Hikmat Hajiyevev described Azerbaijan as part of the Global South “geographically, historically, culturally and by destiny”, repeating Baku's argument that the UN Security Council fails to adequately represent developing countries (Farhadova, 2026).

11. South-south cooperation

Azerbaijan has paired this diplomatic outreach with a growing program of development assistance, built around what officials describe as capacity building and institutional transfer rather than straightforward aid (Mahammadova & Guliyev, 2025). The clearest example is the export of Azerbaijan's ASAN public service centers, which combine government and private services in a single location. In June 2025, with Azerbaijani technical support, Ethiopia opened its own version, the MESOB Service Center, offering more than 120 services under one roof, with similar projects underway in Guinea, Senegal and Guinea-Bissau (Azernews, 2026).

Azerbaijan also runs the Heydar Aliyev Scholarship Program, launched in 2022, which funds university study for students from the Global South. During the 2023/2024 academic year, 365 students from 35 African countries were enrolled in Azerbaijani universities under the program (Mahammadova & Guliyev, 2025). Humanitarian projects run through the Heydar Aliyev Foundation and the Azerbaijan International Development Agency add another layer of goodwill Baku can draw on in international forums (Farhadova, 2026).

12. Decolonization at home

Azerbaijan's reluctance to apply decolonial language to its own Soviet past does not mean nothing has changed domestically. A slower, less publicized process of social reform has been underway since independence, most visibly in disability and education policy (Abdullayeva, 2026). For decades, Azerbaijan retained the Soviet “medical model” of disability - an approach that treated disabled people as patients to be managed rather than as citizens with rights and that kept them largely separated from mainstream schools and workplaces. Since 2022, with support from European Union programs, Azerbaijan has been replacing this with a “social model” built around accessibility and inclusion (Abdullayeva, 2026).

Researchers studying this transition describe Azerbaijani educators as caught between two frames of reference: Western standards of inclusive education on one side and pedagogical habits inherited from the Soviet system on the other (Abdullayeva, 2026). That tension is a useful reminder that decolonization, when it actually happens, tends to look less like a diplomatic campaign and more like a slow, uneven process of changing institutions from the inside.

A similar dynamic is visible in how Armenia and Azerbaijan have started to talk about their own conflict. Following renewed tension in 2024, which included the downing of an Azerbaijan Airlines civilian aircraft by Russian forces, officials in both countries began describing decades of conflict in the South Caucasus as partly a legacy of Russian and Soviet divide-and-rule policy (Zolyan, 2026). As Yerevan and Baku have taken on more direct responsibility for their own peace process - without relying on Moscow or other outside powers to mediate - they have arguably done more practical decolonizing than either government's stated foreign policy acknowledges (Zolyan, 2026).

13. Conclusion

Azerbaijan's anti-colonial turn should be viewed as an intentional diplomatic instrument rather than a consistent worldview. By taking up leadership of the Non-Aligned Movement and then building dedicated institutions - the Baku Initiative Group and the International Decolonization Front foremost among them - Azerbaijan has extended its foreign policy reach well beyond the South Caucasus. The strategy has let Baku raise the political cost of France's support for Armenia by drawing attention to unrest in French overseas territories and tying down French diplomatic attention, while building a base of support across the Global South that helps insulate the Aliyev government from Western criticism.

That same strategy is undermined by its own selectivity. Azerbaijan's silence on British and Russian imperial history and the gap between its international rights advocacy and its treatment of domestic critics, both point to a policy driven by specific interests rather than general principle. That much is hard to miss. None of it has stopped the approach from working on its own terms, however. Azerbaijan has turned a body of theory built to describe colonial relationships into a working part of its diplomatic toolkit, demonstrating how readily that vocabulary can be adapted by a state pursuing its own, fairly narrow, set of goals.

References

- Abdulla, A. (2025). International decolonization front rejects Bougival accord. Trend News Agency. <https://www.trend.az/world/4075286.html>
- Abdullayeva, T. (2026). The mind's decolonisation in post-Soviet country toward inclusive education: Azerbaijan context. *Disability & Society*, 41(4), 904-926. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09687599.2025.2570349>
- Aghayarov, M. (2022). Non-aligned movement in modern international relations and prospects for Azerbaijan. Dissertation, Khazar University, 81.
- AIR Center (Center of Analysis of International Relations) (2025). France's foreign policy failures, scapegoating of Azerbaijan and the New Caledonia question. <https://aircenter.az/uploads/YzP3lA7aG9fn.pdf>

- Avraham, R. (2023). Azerbaijan and the Non-Aligned Movement. Foreign Policy Association. <https://fpa.org/azerbaijan-and-the-non-aligned-movement/>
- AZERNEWS (2026). Baku's soft power: Why African nations buying into Azerbaijan's digital government model. <https://www.azernews.az/analysis/258941.html>
- AZERTAC (2024). Decolonization: Awakening of the Renaissance international conference wraps up in Istanbul. <https://azertag.az/en/xeber/decolonization-awakening-of-the-renaissance-international-conference-wraps-up-in-istanbul-2932897>
- AZERTAC (2026a). Executive Director hails Baku Initiative Group's exemplary role in global decolonization. <https://special.azertag.az/en/xeber/4030283>
- AZERTAC (2026b). Declaration adopted at International Conference on Neocolonialism and Global Inequality. <https://azertag.az/en/xeber/declaration-adopted-at-international-conference-on-neocolonialism-and-global-inequality-4031227>
- Azvision.az (2024). Baku Initiative Group organizes conference on decolonization at UN Vienna Office. <https://en.azvision.az/news/178837/baku-initiative-group-organizes-conference-on-decolonization-at-un-vienna-office.html>
- Baku Initiative Group (2023). Decolonization dialogues: Legacy, challenges and progress. <https://bakuinitiative.org/en/event/decolonization-dialogues-legacy-challenges-and-progress>
- Baku Initiative Group (2026a). Statement by the Baku Initiative Group. <https://bakuinitiative.org/en/news/statement-by-the-baku-initiative-group>
- Baku Initiative Group (2026b). Baku Initiative Group spotlights decolonisation at UNGA. YouTube. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8UTaCcg2U1Y>
- Caucasus Watch (2024). Baku Initiative Group offers mediation in Kanak conflict with French government. <https://caucasuswatch.de/en/news/baku-initiative-group-offers-mediation-in-kanak-conflict-with-french-government.html>
- Caucasus Watch (2025). From Nagorno-Karabakh to Mayotte: Azerbaijan's foreign policy pivot into the anti-colonial arena. <https://caucasuswatch.de/en/insights/from-nagorno-karabakh-to-mayotte-azerbajians-foreign-policy-pivot-into-the-anti-colonial-arena.html>
- Farhadova, A. (2026). Azerbaijan hosts neocolonialism-focused Global South conference. OC Media. <https://oc-media.org/azerbaijan-hosts-neocolonialism-focused-global-south-conference/>
- International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA) (2026). The Indigenous World 2026: Kanaky (New Caledonia). <https://www.iwgia.org/en/news/iw-2026-kanaky-new-caledonia>
- Ismayilov, M. (2015). Postcolonial hybridity, contingency and the mutual embeddedness of identity and politics in post-Soviet Azerbaijan: Some initial thoughts. *Caucasus Analytical Digest*, 77, 7-13. <https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-90314-8>
- Jansezian, G. (2024). Hypocrisy and mystification: Azerbaijan in the Non-Aligned Movement. EVN Report. <https://evnreport.com/politics/hypocrisy-and-mystification-azerbaijan-in-the-non-aligned-movement/>
- Koplatadze, T. (2025). *Postcolonial Identities in Central Asian and Caucasian Literature*. Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/9780198974086.001.0001>
- Mahammadova, A., Guliyev, V. (2025). Emerging Azerbaijan-Africa relations in the context of south-south cooperation. <https://aircenter.az/uploads/n13eixb5FJgt.pdf>
- Makili-Aliyev, K. (2021). The role of Azerbaijan in the non-aligned movement through the lens of international law and security. *The 60th Anniversary of the Non-Aligned Movement. Institute of International Politics*, 359-370. https://doi.org/10.18485/iipe_60nam.2021.ch20
- OHCHR/Baku Initiative Group (2025). Submission to the UN Secretary-General on the implementation of the Second International Decade for People of African Descent.

<https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/cfi-subm/2nd-afri-desc/subm-2025-sg-implementation-cso-21-baku-initiative-group.pdf>

Turkic World (2025). Baku Initiative Group chief addresses event on Colonialism, neocolonialism and its consequences. https://turkic.world/en/articles/video_news/421782

Veloz, Z. (2026). Trouble in paradise: The toxic relationship between France and New Caledonia. Pericles Institute. <https://doi.org/10.57912/31386889>

Wikipedia (2025). Non-Aligned Movement. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-Aligned_Movement

Winter, C. (2026). New Caledonia: The world's next country? <https://yris.yira.org/column/new-caledonia-the-worlds-next-country/>

Zolyan, M. (2026). Decolonization through conflict resolution: Looking at the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process through the lens of decolonization. Caucasus Edition. <https://caucasusedition.net/decolonization-through-conflict-resolution-looking-at-the-armenia-azerbaijan-peace-process-through-the-lens-of-decolonization/>